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Abstract:  
Several papers have tested the empirical validity of the migration models proposed 
by Borjas (1987) and Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992). However, to our knowledge, 
none has been able to disentangle the separate impact of observable and 
unobservable individual characteristics, and their respective returns across different 
locations, on an individual’s decision to migrate. We build a model in which 
individuals sort, in part, on potential earnings – where earnings across different 
locations are a function of both observable and unobservable characteristics. We 
focus on the inter-provincial migration patterns of Canadian physicians. We choose 
this particular group for several reasons including the fact that they are paid on a fee-
for-service basis. Since wage rates are exogenous, earning differentials are driven by 
differences in productivity. We then estimate a mixed conditional-logit model to 
determine the effects of individual and destimation-specific characteristics 
(particularly earnings differentials) on physician location decisions. We find, among 
other things, that high-productivity physicians (based on unobservables) are more 
likely to migrate to provinces where the productivity premium is greater, while low-
productivity physicians are more likely to migrate to areas where the productivity 
premium is lower. These results are consistent with a modified Borjas model of self-
selection in migration based on both unobservables and observables. 
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1 Introduction
The theoretical and empirical economic literature on who migrates and to where
is quite vast. The economic model of migration posits that individuals will mi-
grate if the expected utility of moving to an alternative location is greater than
the expected utility of remaining in their current location (net of transaction
costs). Specifically, holding everything else constant, individuals will migrate
to the location which yields them the highest expected earnings. How much
an individual will earn across different locations is likely to depend on both
individual-specific and location-specific characteristics. Thus, for a heteroge-
nous population, the returns associated with migrating across different locations
are also likely to be heterogenous. In fact, in Borjas (1987) and Borjas, Bronars,
and Trejo (1992), the authors argue that different locations are characterized
by their own wage generating process, each characterized by a mean wage-rate
and a return to individual skills1. In such an environment, conditional on mean
wages, highly-skilled individuals will wish to migrate to regions with a high-
skills premium (i.e., regions with a relatively large variance in wages) whereas
low-skilled individuals will wish to migrate to regions with a relatively low-skills
premium (i.e., regions with a relatively small variance in wages).
Self-selection by workers based on skills is recently tested by Hunt and
Mueller (2004) using Canadian and American data. They use micro-level data
to predict location-specific mean wages (separately for males and females) as
well as location-specific returns to skills. By using these predicted location-
specific mean wages and returns to skills as well as each individual’s wage-rate,
they can classify individuals according to their skill-level. They then test the
Borjas model of selection in a nested-logit framework. That is, they test whether
individuals with greater skills are more likely to migrate, ceteris paribus, to ar-
1Their models build on the seminal work of Roy (1951).
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eas with a greater skills premium. Their findings support Borjas’ model. The
authors do not, however, disaggregate observable and unobservable skills and
their respective returns across locations in the migration decision. Furthermore,
they do not estimate their model separately for each location of origin and so
they cannot allow for both origin and destination specific effects when consid-
ering the migration decision. In a recent paper, Chiquiar and Hanson (2005)
using American and Mexican data test the Borjas model of migration with a
non-parametric approach. Their results are inconsistent with Borjas’ model and
suggest instead intermediate selection. Although their focus is more on who mi-
grates and not on why individuals migrate, they do not consider unobserved
skills.2
Although the above papers have tested the empirical validity of the migration
models proposed by Borjas (1987) and Borjas, Bronars, and Trejo (1992), to our
knowledge none has been able to disentangle the separate impact of observable
and unobservable individual characteristics, and their respective returns across
different locations, on an individual’s decision to migrate. In this paper, we
address these limitations and show that: (i) unobservable characteristics, and
their relative returns across different locations, play an important role in the
migration decisions of individuals, and (ii) ignoring unobservable characteristics
may actually lead to the false rejection of the Borjas model of selection in
migration.
In order to test the Borjas model of migration while considering the separate
contribution of observable and unobservable characteristics in earnings, we focus
on a particular set of workers: Canadian physicians. We choose this particular
group of workers for several reasons. First, in Canada physicians are often sin-
2They also make the limiting assumption that Mexican immigrants living in the US are
not systematically different from those who did not migrate to the US (i.e., who remained
in Mexico). Furthermore, they assume that the return to schooling is higher in all areas of
Mexico than in the all areas of the United-States.
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gled out as a highly-skilled group who frequently experience both international
and interprovincial migration (Finnie (2001) and Barrett (2001)). Furthermore,
focussing on physicians allows us to study the migration decisions of a relatively
homogenous set of workers which permits us to avoid issues related to different
wage-generating processes across different occupations. Finally, and most im-
portantly, Canadian physicians are generally paid on a fee-for-service where the
fees are set at the provincial level. That is, unlike most other groups of workers,
physicians face exogenous wage-rates (where fee-for-service rates vary uniquely
by physician specialty, province of practice, and year).
In the traditional Borjas setup, observationally identical individuals face
different wage-rates because of varying skill levels. This is not the case in our
setup given that all observationally equivalent physicians (i.e., those with the
same specialty who practice in the same province in the same year) face iden-
tical wage-rates. Thus, within group, differences in earnings are not reflected
in differences in wages-rates but, rather, differences in their ability to attract
and treat patients. Consequently, in our setup, highly skilled physicians are
not defined by their ability to garner a higher wage-rate but rather their ability
to make greater earnings given a fixed wage-rate. Even though some of the
variation in earnings is due to observable demographic and human capital char-
acteristics (as well as different returns to such characteristics across locations),
much of the variation in earnings is left unexplained. Exploiting the exogene-
ity of wages, we can predict (for each physician) the unobserved component
which contributes to total earnings - what we call the physician’s unobserved
productivity and which serves as our measure of unobserved skills. This allows
us to estimate the precise role of observable and unobservable components in
the earnings equation (and their respective returns across different locations)
on migration decisions. It also allows us to test whether or not individuals with
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greater unobservable productivity are more likely to migrate to locations where
the productivity-premium is greater.
We develop and estimate a two-stage model of earnings determination and
migration decisions.3 Specifically, we first estimate province-specific earnings
equations and use the estimated parameters to predict each physician’s potential
earnings (based on both observable and unobservable individual and location-
specific characteristics) for each possible destination. We then estimate a mixed
conditional-logit model to examine the effects of individual- and destination-
specific characteristics (particularly earning differentials) on physician location
decisions. This allows us to disentangle the role and the relative importance of
observable and unobservables characteristics and their respective returns across
different locations on physician migration decisions.4
Our results show that unobservable physician characteristics and their re-
turns across different locations are an important element in the migration de-
cision. In fact, omitting such unobservables can lead to false and counter intu-
itive results. For example, we find that individuals in certain provinces appear
to migrate to provinces where they would earn less if potential earnings across
different locations were based exclusively on the individual’s observable char-
acteristics and the province-specific returns to such characteristics. However,
3The structure of our model is similar to standard statistical models of selection in wages.
However, these models usually include a correction for self-selection in the wage equation (see
for example Lee (1978)). In our setting, it is unlikely that movements across provinces are
large enough to cause meaningful changes in the wage distribution. Therefore, as is typical in
the migration literature, we do not incorporate this additional feature in our statistical model.
4Several studies have specifically examined the practice location and/or migration de-
cisions of physicians (Hurley (1991); Dionne, Langlois, and Lemire (1987); Benarroch and
Grant (2004)). Although previous research suggests that certain personal characteristics as
well as differences in potential income across jurisdictions may help explain physician migra-
tion, several limitations should be mentioned (limitations which are often similar to those
in the general migration literature). First, many studies examine only the initial practice
location of recent medical students. As a result, understanding the migration decisions of
physicians over the course of their careers is impossible. Furthermore, many studies are based
on aggregate flow data. Therefore, they are unable to provide information on who, within a
given population, is likely to migrate. Finally, they do not consider the role of observables
and unobservables, and their returns across different locations, on the migration decisions of
physicians.
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including unobserved productivity in the income-generating process shows that
individuals do, in fact, migrate to locations where they can expect to earn more.
Our results are consistent with a modified Borjas model of selection which con-
siders both observable and unobservable components of earnings. That is, we
find that high-productivity physicians (based on unobservables) are more likely
to migrate to provinces where the productivity premium is greater while low-
productivity physicians are more likely to migrate to areas where the produc-
tivity premium is lower.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present
the theoretical model. In section 3 we discuss the data used in estimation. The
statistical model of earnings and migration is presented in section 4. Results are
presented and discussed in section 5. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section
6.
2 Theoretical Model
In this section we present a modified version of Borjas’ model of earnings de-
termination and migrant selection. In Borjas’ model, the natural logarithm of
individual i’s wage in region j is given by:
ln(wij) = µj + φj(υi − υ), (1)
where µj denotes the mean log wage in area j, φj denotes the returns to skills, υi
is the individual’s skill level and υ is the average skill level. Thus, an individual’s
wage in location j is a function of the region-specific average log wage, the
individual’s location in the skills distribution and the region-specific returns to
such skills. As a result, spatial variation in wages is a function of both the
mean wage-rate (µj) and the returns to skills (φj) (assuming identical skills
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distributions across locations). Consequently, individuals will wish to sort on
both of these components in order to maximize their earnings. For example,
conditioning on identical mean wages across two locations, an individual with
high skills (i.e., υi − υ > 0) will wish to migrate to an area with a high-skills
premium while a low-skill individual (υi − υ < 0) will wish to migrate to an
area with a low-skills premium.
In our setting, however, physician wages are characterized by a simple de-
terministic function which reflects the fee-for-service setting in Canada:
ln(wageijt) = f(specialtyi, provincej , yeart). (2)
That is, physicians of the same specialty (i) who practise in the same province
(j) in the same year (t) face an identical wage-rate (or fee-for-service rates).
Thus, within a particular specialty-year-province triplet, the wage distribution
is degenerate. Although wages do not vary within a same triplet, earnings do.
Such variations in physician earnings reflect differences in the number of services
performed (or equivalently, the physician’s work effort or productivity):
earningsijt = number of servicesit ∗ wageijt. (3)
The number of services performed by a given physician depends on the number of
patients the physician can attract and treat which in turn may be influenced by
many variables including the physician’s specialty, medical training, reputation,
productivity, and taste for leisure. It may also be influenced by local market
conditions including the demand for health care services as well as any limits
placed on the total number of services performed by a particular physician. For
example, in certain provinces such as Quebec, physicians face limits on the total
number of services that they may provide (i.e., earnings ceilings). As a result,
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physicians may turn away patients because they may not be (fully) remunerated
for their services. Such a ceiling limits the earnings potential of some physicians,
but likely increases the earning potential of others (i.e., those who would have
difficulty attracting patients).
As a result, we can rewrite:
earningsijt = g(φ1j(observablesit), φ2j(unobservablesi)) ∗
f(specialtyi, provincej , yeart), (4)
where g represents a function translating the physician’s observable character-
istics and unobservable characteristics and their relative returns (φ1j and φ2j ,
respectively) into the number of services performed.
In our model, physician self-selection across different provinces is based on
observable and unobservable characteristics and their province-specific returns.
It is also based on the province-specific wage-rates (or fee-for-service rates).
Based on this modified version of the Borjas selection model, a physician who
has difficulty attracting patients (for example, because of a bad reputation) may
wish to migrate to an area where there is excess demand for medical services
(i.e., where the ‘productivity-premium’ is low). This may occur even if the fee-
for-service rate is lower. On the other hand, a physician who has no difficulty
attracting patients may wish to migrate to a province where the ‘productivity-
premium’ is high (which may occur even if the fee-for-service rate and/or total
demand is lower).
3 Data
This paper makes use of several complementary data sets. The National Physi-
cian Database (NPDB) includes information on almost all Canadian physicians
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who practiced during the 1989-1997 period.5 The data, collected separately by
each province on a yearly basis, include information on several physician char-
acteristics such as: age, date of birth, sex, language spoken, year of graduation
and medical school attended, area of specialization, as well as the physician’s
total annual billings. Because each physician is assigned a unique identification
number, we are able to follow each physician over time.6 However, because the
data are collected at the provincial level, physicians are not tracked when they
leave a given province for another or for abroad. It is important to note that
only active physicians who are paid on a fee-for-service basis are included in this
data set. It is this sample that we use for estimation.
The second data set, the Southam Medical Data Base (SMDB), is a national
data set containing very similar information to the NPDB and collected over the
same period. Although it does not contain the physician’s billing information
it does include his or her postal code. Given that it is a Canada-wide panel
data set, it allows us to track physicians from one geographical location to
another. Thus, we are able to observe when a physician moves to a different
province or abroad. Because the NPDB and the SMDB contain many common
variables (such as the physician’s date of birth, year of graduation, medical
school attended, and medical specialty), they can be merged to form a single
panel which includes many demographic characteristics and the physician’s total
billings and where we observe all physicians over-time and over geographical
areas.7
5Excluded from the data set are physicians: (i) who were inactive, (ii) who were not paid
via fee-for-service, (iii) whose total billings were less than $10,000 or more than $500,000, (iv)
who were under 25 or over 85 years old (v) who were born before 1910 or after 1975, and (vi)
who made a formal request to be removed.
6Medical Specialties include: General Practitioner/Family Medicine, Internal Medicine,
Dermatology, Neurology, Pediatrics, Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation, Public Health,
Emergency Medicine, General Surgery, Cardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery, Neurosurgery,
Obstetrics and Gynecology, Ophthalmology, Otolaryngology, Orthopedic Surgery, Plastic
Surgery, Urology, Anesthesia, Nuclear Medicine, Medical Microbiology, Pathology, Radiology-
Diagnostic, Radiology-Therapeutic, Occupational Medicine, Medical Biochemistry, Medical
Scientist.
7In a handful of cases, more than one physician shared the same values on all common
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The merged data sets include yearly information on 49,046 physicians work-
ing in Canada between 1989 and 1997. Each physician is observed for up to
10 years with 28,897 physicians observed in 1989 and 33,229 observed in 1998
(see Table 1). Several summary statistics are worth noting and are provided for
1989 (the first year of our panel). First, 21 per cent of physicians are female (al-
though the graduating class of physicians is approximately 50 per cent female).
The average age of physicians is 45. Furthermore, physicians self-identified as
English-speaking represent approximately 78 per cent of the physician work-
force and the remainder are self-identified as French-speaking. Finally, 60 per
cent of physicians are coded as specialists while 40 per cent are coded as GPs
or Family Physicians. Table 1 also summarizes migration patterns over this
decade. For example, between 1992 and 1993, 2,715 out of 33,079 physicians
(or 8.21 per cent) in our sample emigrated either from one province to another,
or from a Canadian province to the United-States or abroad. Given that the
large majority of moves were interprovincial, inter-provincial migration is likely
to have a bigger effect on the pool and composition of practising physicians than
international migration.
Table 2 summarizes aggregate migration patterns for the 1989 to 1997 period
for the sample discussed above. That is, it summarizes total migration from each
province (source) to each of the other provinces, the United-States or abroad
(destination). For example, during the 1989-1997 period, 2,817 physicians in
the sample migrated from Quebec to Ontario, while 2,697 physicians migrated
from Ontario to Quebec.8
variables used for merging the data sets. These physicians were excluded.
8These summary statistics are consistent with the literature on physician migration (see
for example, McKendry (1996), Health Canada (1995) and Benarroch and Grant (2004)).
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4 Statistical Model of Migration and Earnings
As noted above, unobserved skills generally refer to the set of skills and abilities
which are unobservable to the econometrician (and are generally difficult to
measure) but nonetheless contribute to an individual’s wage. However, as we
discussed above, wage-rates are exogenous in our framework and thus skills (or,
equivalently, productivity in our setting) are assumed to contribute to higher
earnings via the number of services performed. Data requirements for studies
on the unobservable component which contributes to higher earnings are quite
extensive as migrants must be observed long enough for the econometrician
to infer them. Because our data set allows us to observe individuals prior
to and post interprovincial-migration, we construct a model which allows us to
estimate: (i) the link between individual characteristics and migration (including
the choice of destination), (ii) the importance of potential earning differentials
on migration, and (iii) whether, and to what extent, individuals consider both
observable and unobservable components of earnings (and their returns across
different locations) when making migration decisions.
To analyze the migration decisions of individuals, we use a discrete choice
model. We define the utility for physician i in location (or province) j in year
t to be:
Uijt = β′Xijt + α′jVit + θij + εijt (5)
where Xijt denotes the vector which includes the two different components of
individual i’s predicted wage in location j, that is, the component based exclu-
sively on observable characteristics {denoted as ̂ln earningsijt} and the com-
ponent based on unobservable characteristics {denoted as µ̂ij} (i.e., Xijt =
{ ̂ln earningsijt, µ̂ij}). We discuss both of these components in greater de-
tail below. Vit denotes a vector of observable individual characteristics which
11
directly affect the physician’s utility of being in location j but which are (un-
like Xijt) invariant to the location choice. Vit include the physician’s age, sex,
language spoken (English or French), specialty type (according to the NPDB
classification)9 as well as series of year dummies10:
Vit = {1, ageit, sexi, languagei, specialtyi, yeart}. (6)
Note that the constant term in the V vector captures everything that is specific
to the province which does not vary over time (for example, climate or general
amenities). Time dummies, on the other hand, take into account time-varying
differences between provinces which could affect a physician’s utility in province
j (for example, the level of health care funding or amenities in a given year
or, migration costs in general). θij (where θij = λjθi) represents a random
component which is composed of an individual effect θi (that we assume to
be normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ2θ normalized to 1) and a
choice specific loading factor λj .11 Note that θi is assumed to be independent
of the values of any regressor and that the identification of the load factor λj is
achieved through the observation of the same physician across multiple location
choices j. Thus, the unobservable component for choice j is given by λjθi where
the covariance between λjθ and λj′θ is λjλj′ . As a result, in a model without
covariates, different choices would be negatively (positively) correlated if λjλj′
is negative (positive).12 Finally, εijt denotes a type I extreme value error term.
In order to define Xijt = { ̂ln earningsijt, µ̂ij}, we must first define and
9It is important to note that in certain provinces in certain years we do not necessarily
observe physicians of all types of specialties migrating to all alternate provinces. As a result,
the conditional logit contains at most 23 physician specialty dummies in each branch.
10We exclude 1989 which serves as the reference year.
11See Heckman and Walker (1990) who introduce unobserved heterogeneity in a similar way.
12Allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in this manner serves to relax the IIA assumption
(embeded in many discrete choice models) as we allow choices to be correlated. In fact, as we
discuss later on, IIA is rejected by our results. Taking into account unobserved heterogeneity
is also important in a longitudinal data setting in order to control for spurrious relations with
non-time varying individual characteristics.
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estimate the income generating process. This earnings generating process for
province j (which is estimated separately for each j) is given by:
ln earningsijt = δ0j + δ′1j(wage)ijt + δ2jsexi +
δ3jSchool foreigni +
δ4jageit + δ5jage2it + µij + vijt, (7)
where wage denotes the wage-rate for physician i at time t, sex denotes the
physician’s sex, School foreign is a dummy variable which captures whether or
not the physician graduated from a non-Canadian medical school and age de-
notes the physician’s age. Finally, µ denotes a physician-specific time-invariant
unobserved effect which affects earnings (i.e., his or her unobserved productiv-
ity) while v is a standard error term.
As noted above, the wage-rate is modelled as a deterministic function to
reflect the fee-for-service setting in Canada in which fees are set annually at
the provincial level and are based uniquely on the specialty-type (i.e., fees are
defined uniquely by their year, specialty and province):
wageijt = fj(specialtyi ∗ yeart). (8)
For a given province j, the income generating function is given by (7) but
where wagejit is replace by a series of year∗specialty dummies. As a result, (7)
becomes:
ln earningsijt = δ0j + δ′1j(specialtyi ∗ yeart) + δ2jsexi +
δ3jSchool foreigni +
δ4jageit + δ5jage2it + µij + vijt. (9)
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Using (9), we can predict earnings (more specifically, predict the observable
and unobservable components of earnings) for each individual for each potential
destination j. To do so, we first estimate (9) separately for each province of
origin and obtain a vector of estimated parameters δ̂j (one vector for each
province). We use the best-linear-unbiased predictor for the individual’s random
component µ̂i . Finally, we estimate the variance of µ̂ij for each location j
denoted as σ̂2µj . Thus, provinces with a larger variance in the individual-specific
(productivity) component of earnings can be considered provinces with a larger
productivity-premium.
Using the estimated parameters, δ̂, we first predict earnings for each indi-
vidual if they were to migrate to an alternative province k based exclusively on
observable characteristics, i.e.13,
̂ln earningsikt = δ̂0k + δ̂′1k(specialtyi ∗ yeart) + δ̂2ksexi +
δ̂3kSchool foreigni + δ̂′4kageit. (10)
Then, using µ̂i and σ̂2µj , we calculate for each individual i the unobserved com-
ponents of earnings (to be included in the vector Xijt) for individual i denoted
as µ̂ik if he or she migrated to province k from province j (assuming that he or
she retained his or her location (position) on the unobserved distribution of µ):
µ̂ik =
µ̂i
σ̂2µj
∗ σ̂2µk. (11)
From equation (11) we see that a high-productivity individual (i.e., with a posi-
tive µ̂i) would migrate to a location where the returns to productivity are higher
than in their current location (σ̂2µk is greater that σ̂
2
µj) in order to increase his
13Even if a certain kind of specialist is present in a particular province in a given year, it is
possible that this is not the case for all years. For these specific cases, we run a simpler model
where time and specialty dummies are not interacted and predict wages accordingly.
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earnings, whereas a low productivity individual (i.e., with a negative µ̂i) would
migrate to a location where the returns to productivity are lower than in their
current location (σ̂2µk is greater that σ̂
2
µj).
As noted above, physicians will migrate to location j if doing so yields them
greater utility than migrating to any other location (or staying in the current
location). Given our assumption about the distribution of εidt, the probability
that a physician from a given province will migrate to location j is given by:
P (Yit = j) =
eβ
′Xijt+α′jVit+θij∑D
d=1 e
β′Xidt+α′dVit+θid
. (12)
Estimation is done by maximizing the marginal likelihood and integrating out
the heterogeneity components θi. We use Gauss-Hermite Quadrature to ap-
proximate the normal integral.
We estimate the above model for three different provinces of origin: Ontario,
Quebec, and British Columbia.14 Furthermore, we exclude Newfoundland (3643
observations or 852 physicians) and Prince-Edward Island (852 observations or
155 physicians) as potential destination provinces since these provinces have too
few physicians (and too few specialists) to credibly estimate earnings equations,
and these provinces experience too little in- and out-migration (in terms of ob-
servations) to be included. We also drop four specialties across all provinces for
similar reasons: Public Health, Occupational Medicine, Medical Biochemistry
and Medical Scientist (for a total of 447 observations).
5 Results
In Table 3 we present results from the estimation of regression (9) for each
province. Regression results suggest that many individual characteristics are
14We do not estimate the model for other provinces as there are not enough physicians of
all types (i.e., specialties) who migrate to all alternative locations in all years.
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important determinants of earnings (with different relative importance across
provinces). In fact, we find that the returns to many individual characteris-
tics such as sex, age, language, specialty, and school of graduation vary across
provinces. For example, we find that females generally earn less than their
male counterparts (across all provinces), while French speaking physicians earn
more than their English counterparts in Quebec (a French-speaking province),
but less in Ontario. These results suggest that physicians should sort across
provinces based in part on these observable individual characteristics and their
relative returns in different locations. Finally, Table 3 also presents estimation
results for the variance of the unobserved random effect (σµ) as well as the vari-
ance of the unobserved iid error term (σv). If we interpret the former variance
as the province-specific productivity premium, the modified version of Borjas’
model of selection predicts that physicians with greater unobserved productivity
(greater µ̂ij) will wish to migrate to provinces with a greater σµ.
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present the results from the estimation of the mixed
conditional-logit model given by (12) for physicians initially practising in On-
tario, Quebec and British Columbia, respectively. In what follows we only
present results from the model with unobserved heterogeneity since the more
simple model without unobserved heterogeneity is easily rejected using a likelihood-
ratio test.15 We also do not show results from a model where we include only
one specialty dummy (i.e., assuming that all specialties have the same propen-
sity to migrate) as it was rejected in favour of the more general model with a
dummy for each specialty type.16
Results suggest that individual characteristics are important determinants
of migration and that their relative importance is different across origins and
15This likelihood ratio test is equivalent to a Wald test with the null hypothesis that all load
factors are equal to zero. Rejecting the null is also equivalent to rejecting the IIA assumption.
16It is important to recall that in all earnings regressions, all year-specialty specific effects
(which include the fee-for-service rates) are controlled for but are omitted for presentation
sake.
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destinations. For example, we find that female physicians initially practising in
Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, are less likely to migrate to all provinces
than their male counterparts, although the effect varies across origins and desti-
nations. Our results also suggest that age and country of medical training also
affect the likelihood of migration (and are different across origins and destina-
tions).17,18
Results relating to the effect of potential earning differentials on the likeli-
hood of migrating are somewhat surprising. Our results suggest that potential
earnings differentials based solely on the physician’s observable characteristic
and the province-specialty specific wage-rates are positive but not statistically
significant in an Ontarian physician’s migration decision. This partial result
would seem to suggest that physicians in Ontario do not migrate to other
provinces in order to get greater expected earnings. For physicians initially in
Quebec and British Columbia, they appear to migrate to provinces which yield
them lower total earnings, when considering only observable physician charac-
teristics and their returns across different locations. However, expected earnings
across different provinces are not based solely on observable characteristics, the
returns to such observables, and the province-specialty specific wage-rate. They
also depend on a physician’s unobservable productivity and the returns to such
productivity. In fact, our results suggest that physicians who initially practise
in Ontario, Quebec and British Columbia, are more likely to migrate if they
can earn more elsewhere, where the difference in earnings across locations is
17Our results with respect to the effect of age and sex are in line with the general migration
literature as well as the literature on physician migration. That is, older females are less
likely to migrate than their younger male counterparts (see for example, Schlottmann and
Jr. (1981), Sandefur and Scott (1981), Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989), Antolin and Bover
(1997), Axelsson and Westerlund (1998), and Nivalainen (2004))
18It is important to note that the language spoken by the physician (French or English) is
included in the mixed conditional logit model for physicians initially practising in Quebec.
Results show that English physicians are more likely than French physicians to migrate to all
provinces. These results are consistent with results found in (Robinson and Tomes (1982))
who study migration in a Canadian context.
17
based on unobservable productivity. Because of the relative importance of un-
observables in the earnings equation, results show that physicians do consider
potential earning differentials across locations when making their migration de-
cisions and they are more likely to migrate if doing so will lead to greater total
earnings. Given that earning more, based on unobservables, is associated with
the physician’s unobserved productivity and productivity-premium differences
across provinces, our results show that physicians with higher productivity (i.e.,
a higher µ̂i) are more likely to migrate to areas with a higher productivity pre-
mium (i.e., to provinces with a higher variance in the unobservable component of
earnings). This result supports a modified self-selection model in migration a` la
Borjas based on unobservable productivity differences and relative productivity
premiums across provinces.
These results are important in several respect. First, they suggest that sort-
ing based on observables and unobservables need not go in the same direction
(as is implied by the literature based solely on observables). That is, a physician
may move to increase his or her total earnings even though total earnings would
appear to decrease if only observable characteristics were considered. And, al-
though results based solely on observables may not be consistent with Borjas’
model of selection in migration, allowing for sorting to be based on both ob-
servables and unobservables (and the returns to these across different locations)
leads to results which are consistent.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine self-selection of workers based on observable and
unobservable characteristics and their respective returns across regions. In or-
der to do so, we focus on the inter-provincial migration of physicians in part
because physicians are paid on a fee-for-service basis (which are province-year-
18
specialty specific). This allows us to decompose physician earnings into ob-
servable and unobservable components. The observable component includes
individual physician characteristics and controls for exogenous fee-for-service
rates. The unobservable component captures unobservable individual produc-
tivity which contribute to the physician’s total earnings. We then estimate the
impact of both of these components on the physician’s likelihood of migrating
and choice of destination. This allows us to test whether or not physicians mi-
grate in order to gain greater earnings. More specifically, we test whether or
not physicians migrate for potentially higher earnings assuming that potential
earnings are based on observable and unobservable components separately. We
find that migration decisions and earnings are negatively (or insignificantly)
correlated when only considering the observable characteristics in the earnings
equation (a result which seems to be counter-intuitive). However, our results
suggest that physicians are sorting based on the unobservable component in to-
tal earnings. More specifically, we find that physicians who are (unobservably)
more productive are more likely to migrate to provinces where there exists a
larger productivity premium while those who are (unobservably) less productive
are more likely to migrate to provinces where there exists a smaller productivity
premium. These results are consistent with the idea that individuals migrate, in
part, to increase their total earnings. They are also consistent with a modified
Borjas model where self-selection of workers based on unobserved productivity.
Our results also shed light on the relative importance of observables and
unobservables in the migration decision and potential policy implications. For
example, our results suggest that exogenous increases in fee-for-service rates
(which are part of the vector of observables in the earnings equations) may not
decrease the out-migration of physicians (or increase the in-migration of physi-
cians) as migration is insignificantly (or even negatively) correlated with earn-
19
ings differentials based on such observables. Our results do suggest, however,
that unobserved productivity and returns to unobserved productivity are pos-
itively correlated in the migration decision. This would suggest that provinces
that wish to retain or attract physicians may wish to exploit this dimension (pos-
sibly by eliminating limits on the amount of services a physician may perform
in a given year).
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